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One of the greatest challenges facing empirical fisheries researchers is to endogenize fishing 
effort in bioeconomic models in a way that accounts for fleet heterogeneity. Such heterogeneity 
can manifest in a wide range of both observable and unobservable characteristics of fishing 
vessels and individual fishermen. Without accounting for heterogeneity, we simply have an 
incomplete understanding of how pressure on fish resources responds to policy instruments that 
are available, the states of fish stocks, and exogenous shocks to the system. Largely due to data 
limitations, the discrete choice fisheries literature has focused on modeling unobserved 
heterogeneity through random parameters. In this paper, we draw on the industrial organization 
literature on product differentiation and the public economics literature on spatial sorting to 
estimate sorting models of observable heterogeneity. Models of this type estimate 
individual-specific structural coefficients based on observable individual characteristics and 
choice-specific constants using contraction mapping. We apply the methods to location choices 
and target species choices in the Gulf of Mexico reef-fish fishery. For this application, we have 
an unusual data set that couples daily observations from logbooks with demographic information 
from a mail survey of captains. We use contraction mapping to control for spatially-, and 
species-explicit stock information. The models are used to explore spatial and inter-temporal 
species effort substitution in response to two marine reserves, which are implemented in sample. 
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Effective fishery management requires understanding fish stocks and fishing behavior; 
fish biology and behavior of the harvest sector jointly determine fishery outcomes (Clark 1990). 
Improving our understanding of fishing behavior requires a systematic analysis of heterogeneity 
in the harvest sector. Such heterogeneity can manifest in a wide range of both observable and 
unobservable characteristics of fishing vessels and individual fishermen. Observable 
characteristics include vessel size and type, gear type(s), number of crew, and past behavior 
(fishing effort, location choices, and species targets). Unobservable characteristics include 
fishing skill, risk preferences, willingness to relocate, vessel-specific information about 
abundance, and the opportunity cost of time. All of these features can vary substantially across a 
fishing fleet. Managers ultimately would like to understand the aggregate impacts of policy on 
behavior, but these impacts cannot meaningfully be understood without individual-level 
modeling. Will a model of a representative individual or vessel reasonably reflect the aggregate 
behavior of the fleet? Or, will such a model miss important nuances that are essential for 
understanding the aggregate impact of fishing behavior on the resource base? 
In this paper, we draw on the industrial organization literature on product differentiation 
(Berry 1994; Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 1995) and an emerging literature on spatial sorting in 
public economics (Bayer and Timmins 2005; 2007; Timmins and Murdock 2007) to estimate 
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structural coefficients based on observable individual characteristics and choice-specific 
constants using contraction mapping. We apply the methods to location choices and target 
species choices in the Gulf of Mexico reef-fish fishery. For this application, we have an unusual 
data set that couples daily observations from logbooks with demographic information from a 
mail survey of captains. We use contraction mapping to control for spatially- and species-explicit 
stock information. The models are used to explore spatial and inter-temporal effort substitution in 
response to two marine reserves, which were implemented during our sample period. 
 
Background and Motivation 
Because spatial fishery management tools—e.g. marine reserves and territorial use rights 
in fisheries (TURFs)—aim to manage people spatially, it is fundamental to understand individual 
preferences across locations. These spatial preferences can be inferred from locational sorting 
behavior. A spatially-explicit fishery policy then leads to re-sorting across locations. With spatial 
preference information, fishery managers can predict the redistribution of fishing effort. This is 
important to avoid some unintended outcomes of a policy such as increasing fishing pressure in 
other areas when reducing fishing effort in a protected area. 
Different individuals respond to fishery management differently, and these responses 
often hinge on individual attributes. If the distribution of individual attributes is constant over 
time, it may be appropriate to model a representative fisherman. However, this scenario is not 
generally true. In the short run, fishermen choose between fishing and other job opportunities, 
 3but in the long run, entry and exit occur in the fishery. Thus, the distribution of individual 
attributes is not constant over time. The predicted policy outcome using a representative 
fisherman could differ substantially from the true outcome solely due to individual heterogeneity. 
Managers would like to avoid surprises (Wilen et al. 2002), but failing to account for 
heterogeneity could ultimately compound existing management challenges. For example, a 
season closure might increase fishing intensity before and after the closure for fishermen without 
other employment but may dampen fishing effort for those with other sources of income. In a 
conceptual model, Anderson (2004) shows that diverse behavioral objectives of fishermen can 
lead to different levels of fishing effort for the same stock levels and affect bioeconomic 
equilibria. In the broader behavioral economics literature, Camerer et al. (1997) presents a 
hypothesis that cab drivers in New York attempt to meet income targets rather than maximize 
profits. In many ways, owner-operator fishermen have similar constraints; they make 
labor-leisure tradeoffs, they need certain flows of income to make boat payments, and these 
constraints may trump the incentives to pursue pure profit maximization across time. It is an 
empirical question as to whether these hypothetical examples will show up in real behavioral 
fisheries data.   
Let us consider a specific example from the Gulf of Mexico gag fishery. Gag is a 
long-lived grouper and one of 62 species in the Gulf of Mexico reef fish complex. Gag is a 
sequential hermaphrodite that aggregates to spawn, so managers have particular concerns about 
its reproductive viability in the presence of heavy fishing pressure. The reef fish complex is 
managed with a wide array of policies that target individual species, collections of species, and 
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catch quotas apply to different subsets of reef fish. In recent years, quotas for groupers have been 
divided into shallow-water grouper quota—which includes gag, black, and red grouper among 
others— and deep-water grouper quota—which includes snowy and yellowedge groupers among 
others. There is a 24 inch size limit on gag, and commercial gag fishing is also affected by a 
seasonal closure and two marine reserves. 
In Smith et al. (2006b), we find that aggregate annual effort targeting gag increases in 
response to a seasonal shallow-water grouper closure implemented in 2001 (a one-month closure 
from February 15 to March 15, which is in the middle of the gag spawning season). This rather 
shocking result can be explained by imposing income constraints on the household utility 
maximization problem of individual fishermen. However, formal statistical testing of the 
underlying cause of this aggregate result requires more examination of who is fishing more, and 
what their particular economic circumstances are (e.g. income level, boat ownership, access to 
other fishing permits, home port location, size of the household, etc.).   
Now, let us consider an example about spatial choice that our modeling can explore. In 
June of 2000, the GMFMC formed two marine reserves in the northeastern Gulf. We found that 
after 4.5 years, the aggregate effect of these reserves was a decrease in reef-fish yield (Smith et al. 
2006a). However, the aggregate effect may be masking substitution across target species. Did 
fishermen respond to the reserves by switching to other statistical areas, changing their gear 
configurations, or targeting different species? Alternatively, were behavioral responses minimal, 
in which case the yield decreases directly reflect losses in fishable biomass? This is a hugely 
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reserves. We begin to explore heterogeneous behavioral responses to marine reserves in this 
paper.    
The tools for understanding heterogeneity in the determinants of individual fishing 
behavior have only recently begun to emerge in the broader fisheries economics and 
econometrics literature. For quite some time, authors have used discrete choice models to study 
broad fishery choice (Bockstael and Opaluch 1983), entry and exit decisions (Ward and Sutinen 
1993), and choice of fishing grounds (Eales and Wilen 1986; Dupont 1993; Larson, Sutton, and 
Terry 2000; Curtis and Hicks 2000; Hicks and Schnier 2006). Recent work has emphasized the 
importance of two types of behavioral heterogeneity: state dependence and preference 
heterogeneity. Habit persistence, i.e. fishermen tend to do what they have been doing (Holland 
and Sutinen 2000), is one form of state dependence. Variation in individual preferences is 
another source of heterogeneity that can be modeled with McFadden and Train’s (2000) Mixed 
Logit. Mistiaen and Strand (2000) analyze location choice; Eggert and Tveteras (2004) analyze 
gear choice; and Strand (2004) looks at spatial variation in risk preferences of Gulf of Mexico 
longliners. Smith (2005) combines these two strands of the literature (state dependence and 
heterogeneity), adding more dimensions to the random parameter vector in a Mixed Logit model 
of location choice. Finally, Smith and Wilen (2005) examine preference heterogeneity in fishing 
by estimating separate probit models for each individual and bootstrapping standard errors to test 
hypotheses about the population of fishermen. They demonstrate that behavioral responses to 
physical risk, financial risk, and other aspects of the economic environment are heterogeneous. 
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individual discrete decisions simultaneously unfold over space and time.  Three examples in 
Gulf of Mexico are participation (when to go fishing), species target, and fishing location choice. 
All of these, combined with the amount and type of gear deployed, are critical determinants of 
fishing effort. Nested logit models have been used to study joint participation and location choice 
in fisheries (Berman, Haley, and Kim 1997; Smith 2002; Smith and Wilen 2003), but these 
models still impose a very restrictive substitution pattern. A model that has more flexibility in 
substitution patterns and that can incorporate a rich parameterization of heterogeneity is essential 
to learning more about fishing behavior. We depart from the emphasis in the literature on 
unobserved heterogeneity and instead model observed heterogeneity. 
 
The Model 
We model the choice of fishing location choice and species target jointly in a random 
utility framework. The utility of individual i choosing the species-location alternative j at time t 
is: 
(1)   ijt ijt ijt uvε =+.  
Following Bayer and Timmins (2005), the deterministic term is decomposed into effects of 
choice-specific attributes and a choice-specific constant: 
(2)   () () ( ) ( ) ijt jt jt jt ij j v Reserve P CPUE D δ =+ + +
'' ' '
i1 i2 i3 i4 x β x β x β x β +
)
, 
where  ( 12 kk k I β ββ = k β " , and the number of individual characteristics in xi is I (including a 
‘1’ for the constant term). The observed individual heterogeneity is thus a function of individual 
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effect of individual-specific attributes. The model setup is comparable to a Mixed Logit model 
with random parameters (McFadden and Train 2000). However, assuming that the parameter 
heterogeneity is observable, this model significantly reduces the computational intensity. The 
following summarizes the nomenclature in (2): 
i x : individual attributes (speed, vessel length, income, income from commercial 
fishing, age, and a ‘1’ for the constant term); 
jt Reserve : marine reserve policy.  1 jt Reserve =  if  individual  i chooses 
alternative j when and where a marine reserve is present. 
jt P : species-specific monthly price (red snapper, grouper and other reef); 
jt CPUE : species- and location-specific catch-per-unit-effort; 
ij D : distance; 
j δ : alternative-specific constant; and 
ijt ε : i.i.d. error term with a Type I Extreme Value distribution. 
The unobservable alternative-specific constant not only captures location- and 
species-heterogeneity such as carrying capacity, but also controls agglomeration and 
congestion effect. Omitting these information leads to biased estimators. The 















The choice set   varies over time due to the seasonal closure policy for red snapper and  t J
 8grouper species. The alternative of non-reef fish is estimated as the baseline. The utility of 
participating in the non-reef fish fishery is normalized to one. The alternative-specific constants 
are estimated through Berry Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) contraction mapping (hereafter, BLP): 
(4)   ,  () () ln ln
new old old ss δδ δ ⎡⎤ =+ − ⎣⎦

where s is the observed share vector for alternatives and 







= ∑  . 
N is the total number of choice occasions. The routine starts with a guess at the δ’s, estimates the 
β’s, in (2) conditional on this guess using maximum likelihood, and then updates the δ’s 
according to (4) and (5). The iterative routine stops when all of the parameter values have settled.   
Some notes on the motivation for using BLP contraction mapping are in order here. 
Given the large data sets that are common in fishing logbooks and the large number of choices 
(J=40) when crossing three species aggregates with 13 fishing locations (and including a choice 
for non-reef fishing normalized to zero), the BLP contraction is computationally more feasible 
and stable than putting in choice-specific dummy variables. Still, with just 40 choices, it is 
possible to estimate these coefficients with dummy variables using conventional maximum 
likelihood. The more compelling motivation for this approach is that BLP uses population level 
information to exactly identify the choice-specific constants. When we link our analysis to the 
survey data, we necessarily exclude individuals who did not respond to the survey. We are able to 
include non-respondents in the population. The asymptotic properties of BLP stem from the use 
of population shares, though often researchers end up using sample data for the contraction. Here 
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pin down the fixed effects. 
For comparing models that incorporate heterogeneity and choice-specific fixed effects, 
we are interested in the “marginal” effect of forming a marine reserve. The effect, strictly 
speaking, is not “marginal” because locations either contain a reserve or they do not. Thus, the 
definition of the marginal effect is: 
(6)   { } { } Pr | , 1 Pr | , 0 y j X Reserve y j X Reserve == − == , 
where y is the choice variable and  ijt X  is the mean of all variables except the reserve dummy. 
The estimated marginal effect is the mean across individuals. It is also possible to estimate the 
individual-specific marginal effect. This is particularly useful when this model is used to predict 
the location and species distribution of effort in the case of heterogenous fishing vessels. 
 
Data 
We constructed a unique data set that we believe is unprecedented in previous research in 
fisheries economics. The data set combines: 1) daily choice records from federal logbook data on 
the Gulf of Mexico reef fish fishery, 2) federal commercial fishing permit data, 3) species-level 
price data from Florida landings tickets, 4) a social survey of reef fish captains, 5) NOAA 
weather buoy data, 6) county-level unemployment statistics (from Bureau of Labor Statistics), 
and 7) publicly-available census data. For this paper, we use just the first four of these data 
sources. It is the integration of a social survey with repeated choices from logbooks that is 
unique.  
 10The logbook data report fishing location by National Marine Fishery Service fishing 
zones (depicted in Figure 1) and catch by species. Our data set contains a complete set of records 
for 1993-2004. For purposes of analyzing discrete location choices and species target decisions, 
we aggregate the 62 reef fish species into three groups: grouper, snapper, and other reef fish. 
Permit data provide information about vessel length for each of the unique vessels that appear in 
the logbook data. Florida landings tickets were provided by the Florida Marine Research Institute 
(FMRI), a division of the Florida Department of Fish and Wildlife. We use these data to develop 
weighted average price time series for each of our species aggregates. 
We conducted a social survey of reef fish captains by mail in 2005. A unique aspect of 
our survey was the ability to link repeated fishing choices to the individual survey respondents. 
This entailed cooperation with both state and federal agencies to enable us to track individual 
vessels over space and time, associate the survey responses with these records, obey 
confidentiality rules, and limit access to the survey data to our team. To this end, NOAA 
Fisheries provided FMRI with a complete permit data base with vessel codes and names and 
addresses of permit holders. FRMI generated a unique survey identifier associated with each 
vessel code and stripped the identifying information about reef fish captains (e.g. names and 
addresses) from the version of the file sent to us. We prepared the mail surveys with the unique 
survey codes, and FMRI did the mailing on our behalf. The pre-paid return envelopes were 
addressed to us. In this way, we were able to assure reef fish captains that their survey responses 
would not be made available to state or federal regulators (a significant concern of many 
commercial fishermen).   
 11Survey administration followed the Dillman (1978) method. We first developed a draft 
survey and ran a focus group with reef fish captains in the northeastern Gulf. As a result of the 
focus group, we removed many of the questions about risk preferences (particularly gambling 
activities, which clearly struck a nerve with some fishermen in our focus group). We then 
conducted a very limited pre-test with the revised survey (n = 3) and extensive phone debriefings 
with each of the pre-test participants. See Appendix A for the full survey. We administered five 
separate mailings: 1) a pre-notification post card, 2) the survey along with a gift, 3) a follow-up 
reminder post card, 4) a second copy of the survey, and 5) a third copy of the survey. With the 
initial mailing of each survey, we included a gift of a DVD with video footage from inside the 
Madison-Swanson Marine Reserve. At this stage, we are using a very small portion of the 
information that we collected. Table 1 reports a summary of the survey response rate (46 - 47%). 
One drawback of using survey data in conjunction with logbooks is that we are limited by 
both survey non-respondents and non-responses to particular survey questions. As a first step, we 
use a small subset of the available survey data, including questions on vessel speed, total income, 
captain’s age, and percentage of income derived from commercial fishing. This leaves us with 
373 individuals and 28,399 total choices.   
 
Results 
Table 2 reports mean coefficient results from the discrete choice model. These are 
interpretable as the standard coefficients of a conditional logit model. All parameters are highly 
significant. Price, CPUE, and distance all have their expected signs; a higher species price 
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species in a specific location, and longer travel distances decrease the probability of fishing at a 
particular site. The ex ante expected sign of the reserve effect is less obvious. On the one hand, 
we expect that the reserve eliminates some of a fishing ground and thus reduces the profitability 
of fishing in the surrounding zone (Smith et al. 2006a). But on the other hand, from our survey 
33% of fishermen report that marine reserves in the Gulf of Mexico have increased fishing yields 
of groupers and other reef fish. Empirically, the mean coefficient for reserves is negative.   
Table 3 reports the interaction effects from the discrete choice model. These can be 
interpreted as how individual observable heterogeneity modifies the mean response to the 
structural covariates. Most of the interactions are statistically significant, suggesting that the 
observable sources of heterogeneity are partly driving the observed behavior in the fishery. One 
interesting finding is that vessel speed has a negative effect on the tendency to fish in a zone that 
contains a reserve and also has a negative effect on the distance. Vessel length, on the other hand, 
has positive effects on both, though the distance interaction is not significant. These results point 
to an interesting source of heterogeneity in the fishery. The smaller vessels tend to be faster, but 
by virtue of being smaller, have less hull capacity and tend to make shorter trips. They may be 
designed to get to a fishing site quickly and return to port within the same day. Faster vessels 
thus are more averse to longer travel distances. The opposite is true for large vessels.   
Though not all of the income interactions are significant, the CPUE and distance 
interactions suggest a troubling problem in the reef fish fishery. Lower income individuals are 
less responsive to changes in CPUE and less responsive to travel distance. This naturally raises a 
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as good at fishing? Or, alternatively are their prospects in other fisheries or outside of fishing so 
small that they can less afford to adjust fishing effort to economic conditions than wealthier 
fishermen?  
Captain age is another interesting finding. We find that older fishermen are less 
responsive to marginal changes in all of the economic opportunities. That is, the signs of the 
captain age interactions are all opposite of what we find in the mean coefficient levels. Holland 
and Sutinen (2000) suggest that “old habits die hard” for New England fishermen. One 
interpretation of our model is that older fishermen have formed strong fishing habits and thus are 
less responsive to changes in the economic environment.   
Figure 2 depicts the choice-specific fixed effects solved for in the BLP contraction 
mapping. Moving along the x-axis, geographically, is moving counter-clockwise through the 
Gulf of Mexico starting from the southern tip of Florida until Louisiana. This figure provides an 
average picture of the relative abundance over space of the three species aggregates in our model. 
Unlike a traditional stock assessment model, these stock indices are derived implicitly from the 
observed behavior of the fishing fleet alone.   
Table 4 summarizes our analysis of the reserve effect. Here, we take the model estimates 
reported above as the full model and derive individual net effects of the reserves on the 
probability of each choice as described by equation (6). We average across individuals to 
produce a mean net effect (hereafter mean effect). Note that this differs from the mean 
coefficient on reserves in Table 2, which is just the size of the individual effect assuming all 
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econometrics three different ways: 1) excluding the choice-specific constants, 2) excluding the 
observable heterogeneity, and 3) excluding both constants and observable heterogeneity. We 
derive the individual net effects and the corresponding mean effects for each of these models. We 
then take the ratio of each mean effect to the mean effect from the full model. Thus, a ratio of 1.0 
would indicate that the models do not produce a different mean effect. 
It goes without saying that the individual effects will differ, but what is interesting about 
Table 4 is that there are major differences in some of the mean effects. That is, accounting for 
observable heterogeneity and choice-specific fixed effects leads to very different conclusions 
about the mean behavioral response of the reef fish fleet to the formation of two marine reserves. 
These differences appear both in zones that contain the reserves (6 and 8) and in the other zones. 
With the exception of groupers, the model that excludes observed heterogeneity but still includes 
choice-specific constants comes close to estimating the mean behavioral effect of the reserve 
from the full model. The results do not hold for grouper most likely because the reserves were 
formed in part to protect gag and other shallow-water groupers, and thus the overall behavioral 
response is more pronounced.     
 
Discussion 
We present results form a unique data set that allows us to explore the effect of 
observable heterogeneity on behavioral responses to marine reserves. Collecting survey data and 
linking it with logbook information is both costly and bureaucratically complicated. Our 
 15statistical estimates and comparisons across models indicate that this sort of activity may be 
worth the effort. Without conducting a survey, an intermediate step for other applications would 
be to exploit vessel information that exists in permit files together with repeated choices in 
logbooks. Our results also show that including choice-specific constants has an even more 
pronounced effect on behavioral responses to reserves than observable heterogeneity. Thus, there 
is strong support for using the BLP contraction to estimate these choice-specific effects, 
especially if the number of choices is large and the population information is available. Both of 
these conditions are likely to be true for federally managed fisheries, particularly as we move 
towards using more spatial management tools.     
The spatial resolution of our data is not sufficient to exploit the power of the sorting 
model to its fullest potential. One of the strengths of this econometric modeling approach is the 
ability to decompose the estimation into two stages and use the second stage to disentangle 
agglomeration or congestion effects from the alternative-specific constant. We can easily imagine 
both features existing in fisheries. Agglomeration could arise from some common information 
about spatially explicit abundance that is not observed by the analyst. Congestion externalities, in 
contrast, occur when boats fish in close proximity to one another, compete for the same fish, and 
increase the risks of fishing lines becoming entangled or even boat collisions. Spatial choice in 
Alaskan groundfish fisheries—see Berman 2006; Berman et al. 2007; Haynie and Layton 2006; 
Abbott and Wilen 2007— is potentially a fruitful area for future research. In that context, the 
spatial resolution of fishing data is higher, and there is substantial interest in understanding the 
effects of micro-spatial closures (mostly to protect critical habitat of threatened steller sea lions).   
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Figure 1 – National Marine Fisheries Service Fishing Zones and the Two Marine Reserves 
Formed in 2000







































Figure 2 – Choice-specific Constants from the BLP Contraction Mapping, Based on 
Logbook Population Data 
 22Table 1 – Summary of Survey Response Rate 
 
Surveys Surveys Response 
Mailed Returned Rate
Total 1079 495 45.9%
Adjusted* 993 464 46.7%
*Removes blanks with 'No Longer Fishing in Gulf', 
  incorrect address, or duplicate permit holder.  
 
 23Table 2 – Mean Coefficients from the Discrete Choice Model 
 
Estimate St. Error
Reserve -1.08 0.219 **
Price 9.82 0.145 **
CPUE 0.79 0.120 **
Distance -4.03 0.079 **
# Choices 28,399
# Individuals 373
# Alternatives 40  
 
** Indicates significant at the 5% level. 
 
Table 3 – Interaction Coefficients from the Discrete Choice Model 
 
Estimate St. Error
Reserve Speed -1.113 0.3272 **
Vess. Length 1.928 0.3422 **
Income < $35K -0.029 0.0628
Commercial > 60% Income -0.154 0.0535 **
Cap. Age 2.437 0.2634 **
Price Speed -2.507 0.2006 **
Vess. Length -2.871 0.2101 **
Income < $35K 0.026 0.0398
Commercial > 60% Income -0.004 0.0352
Cap. Age -3.074 0.1729 **
CPUE Speed -0.735 0.1878 **
Vess. Length 2.004 0.1639 **
Income < $35K -0.365 0.0399 **
Commercial > 60% Income -0.143 0.0317 **
Cap. Age -0.726 0.1429 **
Distance Speed -0.537 0.1151 **
Vess. Length 0.155 0.1092
Income < $35K 0.965 0.0276 **
Commercial > 60% Income 0.165 0.0185 **
Cap. Age 2.605 0.0917 **  
 
** Indicates significant at the 5% level.
 24Table 4 – Comparing the Effect of the Marine Reserve on Mean Choice Probability 
Reports the Share of the Reserve Effect from the Full Model that Each of the Other Three 








1 1 1,355.31     6.89          1,562.95           
1 2 206.72        4.79          235.65              
1 3 1,836.67     4.05          2,019.43           
1 4 1,344.84     3.54          1,415.59           
1 5 1,193.76     3.64          1,226.49           
1 6 280.14        3.38        295.74            
1 7 81.51          2.77          84.28               
1 8 43.00         2.43        46.42             
1 9 20.02          2.01          21.51               
11 0 9 . 4 8            2.14          10.53               
11 1 5 . 1 0            2.03          5.88                 
1 12 58.44          3.03          70.39               
11 3 1 . 1 3            2.28          1.36                 
2 1 1.55            1.48          1.77                 
2 2 0.58            1.25          0.65                 
2 3 0.98            1.04          1.07                 
2 4 0.45            0.82          0.47                 
2 5 0.47            0.85          0.48                 
2 6 0.22           0.87        0.23               
2 7 0.27            0.79          0.27                 
2 8 2.83           0.99        3.03               
2 9 5.18            0.88          5.52                 
2 10 17.64          0.96          19.46               
2 11 19.34          0.98          22.18               
2 12 271.86        0.98          325.37              
21 3 7 . 6 1            1.05          9.11                 
3 1 0.04            0.93          0.04                 
3 2 0.04            0.96          0.04                 
3 3 0.71            0.98          0.78                 
3 4 0.59            0.84          0.63                 
3 5 0.69            0.92          0.71                 
3 6 0.39           0.92        0.41               
3 7 0.36            0.82          0.37                 
3 8 0.94           0.96        1.02               
3 9 0.65            0.84          0.70                 
31 0 0 . 5 3            0.83          0.59                 
31 1 0 . 4 7            0.87          0.54                 
31 2 3 . 7 9            0.95          4.59                 
31 3 0 . 1 7            1.07          0.21                   
 25Appendix A – Survey of Reef Fish Captains 
(Note Pagination and Formatting Has Changed)           
           
Survey # 
Survey for Captains in the Gulf of Mexico Reef Fish Fishery 
Fishing and Employment 
 
This survey is mostly concerned with commercial fishing but has some questions about charter fishing. 
We define commercial fishing as catching fish to sell, and charter fishing as running recreational 
charters for hire. 
 
1. How many total years have you been a captain in commercial fishing? 
_____  1 year or less    _____    2 to 5 years    _____    6 to 10 years   
_____    11 to 15 years   _____    16 to 20 years   _____    More than 20 years 
 
2. How many years have you worked in commercial fishing? 
_____    1 year or less    _____    2 to 5 years    _____    6 to 10 years   
_____    11 to 15 years   _____    16 to 20 years   _____    More than 20 years 
 
3. How many years have you been the captain of your current vessel? 
_____  1 year or less    _____    2 to 5 years    _____    6 to 10 years   
_____    11 to 15 years   _____    16 to 20 years   _____    More than 20 years 
 
4. What is the maximum speed of your vessel? ______________ knots 
5. What types of fishing gear do you use on your vessel?   
Please check all that apply. 
_____   Traps      _____   Handline _____   Gill  Net 
_____   Longline   _____   Trolling  _____   Diving  Gear 
_____    Bandit Reel    _____ Other, please specify _____________________________ 
 
6. What types of fish-finding equipment do you have on board? 
7. Do you commercial fish in areas outside of the Gulf of Mexico, for instance along the East Coast of Florida 
or in other parts of the country? 
 26_____   Yes   _____   No 
 
  7a. If yes: 
What percentage of your annual commercial fishing effort do you spend in    areas outside of the Gulf 
of Mexico ?   
  _____ 0% to 20%   _____ 21% to 40% _____ 41% to 60%  
  _____ 61% to 80% _____ 81% to 100% 
 
7b. Besides the Gulf of Mexico, in what other general areas do you commercial fish? 
                    
7c. What species do you target in areas outside of the Gulf of Mexico? 
 
8. What other forms of employment are you engaged in besides commercial fishing?   
Check all that apply. 
_____ Charter Fishing 
_____ Food processing or food services 




_____ Financial, legal, medical, or other professional services 
_____ Other, please specify _____________________________________ 
 
9. After subtracting the costs of fishing, what percentage of your annual household income comes from 
commercial fishing?   
_____ 0% to 20%     _____ 21% to 40%   _____ 41% to 60%  
_____ 61% to 80%   _____ 81% to 100% 
  
10. If you do charter fishing, after subtracting the costs of fishing, what percentage of your annual household 
income comes from charter fishing?   
_____ 0% to 20%     _____ 21% to 40%   _____ 41% to 60%  
_____ 61% to 80%   _____ 81% to 100% 
 
11. If you have other forms of employment, on an annual basis what percentage of your total work hours do 
you spend in commercial fishing? 
_____ 0% to 20%     _____ 21% to 40%   _____ 41% to 60%  
_____ 61% to 80%   _____ 81% to 100% 
 
12. If you have non-fishing employment, is this employment seasonal?   
_____ Yes  _____ No 
 
 27  12a. If yes: 
  What months of year do you have the most non-fishing employment? Check all that apply. 
  _____ Jan.    _____ Feb.  _____ Mar.  _____ Apr.    _____ May  _____ Jun. 
  _____ Jul.    _____ Aug.  _____ Sep.  _____ Oct.    _____ Nov.  _____ Dec. 
  
13. At how many different ports do you land fish? 
_____ 1  _____ 2  _____ 3  _____ 4  _____ more than 4 
 
14. To how many different fish houses or retailers do you sell fish? 
_____ 1  _____ 2  _____ 3  _____ 4  _____ more than 4 
 
15. Do you always keep your boat at the same dock? 
_____ Yes  _____ No 
                    
  15a. If yes, do you have a long-term contract with the dock owner?         
  _____ Yes  _____ No 
 
  15b. What is your monthly dock rent?      ________ 
 
16. What are the most important weather indicators that affect your decision of whether or not to take a fishing 
trip? Please rank from 1 (most important) through    7 (least important). 
 
_____ Wave height   _____ Wave period   _____ Wind speed 
_____ Wind direction    _____ Storm warnings  _____ 5-day weather forecast 
_____ Other, please specify __________________________________________________ 
 
17. When weather conditions are bad, what other factors influence your decision to go fishing?   
Check all that apply. 
_____ Personal safety 
_____ Potential damage to your boat 
_____ Fish market conditions (high or low prices) 
_____ A seasonal closure of the fishery is coming soon. 
_____ A seasonal closure of the fishery just passed. 
_____ Your earnings in fishing over the past few months were high (or low). 
_____ You have (or do not have) other sources of income. 





_____ Male  _____ Female 
 28 
19.  Age 
 
_____ 18 - 29    _____ 30 - 39  _____ 40 - 49  _____ 50 – 59    _____ 60 or older 
 
20. Marital Status: 
 
_____ Single    _____ Married    _____ Divorced 
 
21. How many children do you have? 
_____ none  _____ 1   _____ 2  _____ 3  _____ 4 or more 
 
22. Do you smoke? 
_____ Yes  _____ No 
 
23. Please indicate the category that best represents your total annual household income after subtracting out 
the costs of fishing. 
_____ Under $20,000 
_____ $20,001 to $35,000 
_____ $35,001 to $50,000 
_____ $50,001 to $65,000 
_____ $65,001 to $80,000 
_____ $80,001 and over 
 
24. Do you own a home? 
_____ Yes    _____ No 
 
25. Do you have life insurance?   
_____ Yes    _____ No 
 
26. Do you have health insurance?   
_____ Yes    _____ No 
Beliefs about Marine Reserves and Other Forms of Fisheries Management 
27. Are you familiar with the Madison-Swanson Marine Reserve, Tortugas Ecological Reserve, or the 
Steamboat Lumps Marine Reserve? 
_____ Yes    _____ No 
 
28. When these reserves were first proposed, did you believe that they would increase fishing yields of grouper 
and other reef fish species? 
_____ Yes    _____ No 
 29  
  28a. If yes, how long did you think that it would take for yield increases to happen? 
  _____ Less than 6 months _____ 6 months to 1 year  _____ 1 to 2 years 
  _____ 2 to 3 years    _____ More than 3 years 
  
29. The Madison-Swanson and Steamboat Lumps reserves took effect in the year 2000, and Tortugas took 
effect in 2001. Since these reserves took effect, have you changed your beliefs about how they affect fishing 
yields? 
_____ Yes    _____ No 
 
30. Do you believe that these marine reserves have increased grouper or other reef fish yields? 
_____ Yes    _____ No 
 
  30a. If yes, how long did it actually take for yield increases to happen? 
  _____ Less than 6 months _____ 6 months to 1 year  ____ 1 to 2 years 
_____ 2 to 3 years    _____ More than 3 years 
 
31. What do you think are the most important obstacles to the future success of Gulf of Mexico reef fish 
fisheries? Please rank from 1 (most important) through 6 (least important). 
_____ There are too many permit holders. 
_____ Some gear types are too efficient. 
_____ There is too much bycatch or too many discards of undersized fish. 
_____ Some sectors, recreational or commercial, catch too much. 
_____ Existing fisheries management does not work. 
_____ Other, please specify _________________________________________________________. 
 
32. What do you think are the most effective forms of fisheries management? Please rank from 1 (most 
effective) through 7 (least effective).   
_____ Restrict the number of permit holders 
_____ Marine reserves or other types of no-take zones 
_____ Seasonal closures 
_____ Individual fishing quotas 
_____ Size limits 
_____ Gear restrictions 
_____ Other, please specify _________________________________________________________. 
 
For the following questions, we would like you to consider broad definitions for costs and benefits. Costs 
may include your boat payment, hiring labor, and purchasing bait, fuel, ice, and fishing  and safety 
equipment. They also include the cost of your time. If a type of management causes you to spend more 
time fishing to make the same amount of money, we view that as a cost. Similarly, benefits might include 
the revenue that you earn from selling fish and any savings in time spent fishing. Please indicate whether 
 30you agree or disagree with the following statements.   
 
33. Overal e Madison anson Marin eserve created m  benefits for fisher  than costs.  l, th -Sw e R ore men
                         
S t r o n g l y   A g r e e         A g r e e              U n c e r t a i n          D i s a g r e e           S t r o n g l y   D i s a g r e e  
 
34. Overal e Steambo umps Marin serve created m  benefits for fisher  than costs.  l, th at L e Re ore men
                         
S t r o n g l y   A g r e e         A g r e e              U n c e r t a i n          D i s a g r e e           S t r o n g l y   D i s a g r e e  
 
35. Overal e Tortugas logical Res  created more b its for fishermen th osts.  l, th  Eco erve enef an c
                         
S t r o n g l y   A g r e e         A g r e e              U n c e r t a i n          D i s a g r e e           S t r o n g l y   D i s a g r e e  
 
36. In general, marine reserves are a bad  to manage fisheries.   way
                         
S t r o n g l y   A g r e e         A g r e e              U n c e r t a i n          D i s a g r e e           S t r o n g l y   D i s a g r e e  
 
37. In general, marine re es are a bett ay to manage fi ies than seasonal closures.  serv er w sher
                         
S t r o n g l y   A g r e e         A g r e e              U n c e r t a i n          D i s a g r e e           S t r o n g l y   D i s a g r e e   
 
38. Season losures for ishermen to   in bad weather al c ce f fish . 
                         
S t r o n g l y   A g r e e         A g r e e              U n c e r t a i n          D i s a g r e e           S t r o n g l y   D i s a g r e e  
 
39. Marine erves impo ore costs o hermen than se al closures.   res se m n fis ason
                         
S t r o n g l y   A g r e e         A g r e e              U n c e r t a i n          D i s a g r e e           S t r o n g l y   D i s a g r e e  
 
40. Permit buyouts will significantly reduce pressure on reef fish in the Gulf of Mexico. 
                         
S t r o n g l y   A g r e e         A g r e e              U n c e r t a i n          D i s a g r e e           S t r o n g l y   D i s a g r e e  
 
41. Please provide any additional comments about reef fishery management in the Gulf of Mexico. 
42. Please provide comments about the survey. 
 
Your opinions and the information that you have provided on this survey matter!  Please return your 
completed survey in the self-addressed postage-paid envelope provided. 
 
Thank you again for taking the time to complete this survey! 
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